In this paper we report experiments that examine how two structural features of electricity networks contribute to the exercise of market power in deregulated markets. The first feature is the distribution of ownership of a given set of generating assets. In the market power treatment, two large firms are allocated baseload and intermediate cost generators such that either firm might unilaterally withhold the capacity of its intermediate cost generators from the market to benefit from the supracompetitive prices that would result from only selling its baseload units. In the converse treatment, ownership of some of the intermediate cost generators is transferred from each of these firms to two other firms, so that no one firm could unilaterally restrict output to spawn supra-competitive prices.
Introduction
The privatization movement in the electricity industry began in Chile and the United Kingdom in the 1980s, and spread to many other countries by the mid 1990s. The U.S. industry has recently joined this trend as California and other states have legislated the introduction of competition in the production of electrical energy. This deregulation, however, has dealt most immediately with the wholesale market, not the prices paid by the end use consumer, whose rates typically are not time variable throughout the day, week and season. This has been the crux of the problem, because wholesale energy costs alone vary from peak to off peak by a factor of six or more on normal summer days of high load demand. Consequently, the local distributor provides a time average cost buffer, which, in effect, subsidizes peak consumption while taxing off-peak consumption. In one of our experimental treatments we relax this artificial constraint by introducing price responsive demand side bidding, which we use to compare with the usual supply side auction mechanism both with and without the presence of market power in generation ownership
Market power was an issue in the United Kingdom from the outset of privatization, which created five independent sources of energy: two private generation companies, the nuclear units retained by the Crown, and import competition on transmission lines connecting the UK grid with France and Scotland. Competition, however, was compromised by three considerations. Capacity on the interconnect lines to Scotland and France was too small to be a competitive factor. Nuclear energy provided only low cost baseload capacity and was not competitive at the short run margin. All load following capacity, which represents the critical marginal generator units, was owned by the two new generator companies created by privatization. Finally, no technical provision was made under privatization to mandate or encourage demand-side bidding implemented by interruptible delivery technologies [Littlechild (1995) ].
Earlier papers have reported experimental studies of the effect of transmission constraints on market power [Backerman, Rassenti and Smith (1997) , compared the competitivity of three versus six generation companies [Backerman, Denton, Rassenti, and Smith (1996) and Denton, Rassenti and Smith (1997) ], or analyzed market power arising from either small numbers or transmission constraints [Zimmerman et al., (1999) ]. These studies used spot market auctions with demand-side bidding. Wolfram (1999) evaluates the applicability of various oligopoly models that have been applied to electricity markets. She finds that Cournot behavior [see e.g., Cardell et al (1997) and Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) ] and supply function equilibrium [see e.g., Green and Newbery (1992) ] predict prices that are greater than what she finds by measuring price-cost markups in several ways. In a controlled laboratory setting we can design the environment so that we know exactly the range of prices that can be supported as competitive or non-cooperative equilibria. In some cases the prices we observe are not as high as Pareto-superior noncooperative equilbria would predict, and in others they are greater. Unlike field studies, the advantage of the laboratory experiment is that we can analyze the offer curves under different treatments, not just the price-cost margin. Although offer schedules are available for study in some field environments, in none can the effect of controlled treatments, such as demand-side bidding, be assessed. Furthermore, we can exert exact control over the factors that influence demand.
In this paper we measure the effect of market power in a demand cycle in which the number of generators is held fixed, but the distribution of their ownership is altered in controlled comparisons that are designed to allow market power to be expressed. We also evaluate the effect of transmission constraints on market power. Finally, we measure and analyze the effect on market prices of introducing demand-side bidding with and without the presence of market power, and in the absence of transmission constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines market power in a sealed bid-offer market and outlines our market structure and design for the experiment. Section 3 discusses the procedures of our experiment, and Section 4 presents the results. Having established a wellcontrolled data set with price spikes paralleling those observed in the naturally occurring economy, we then in Section 6 extend the design to include demand-side bidding. Section 6 summarizes the implications for public policy and offers directions for future work.
Market Structure and Design
We examine a very simple environment, relative to actual electric power systems: (1) a threenode radial network 1 (in line, so that power from any source flows on a single path to any sink); (2) transmission losses are negligible; (3) generators have no sunk or avoidable fixed costs, no minimum capacities, and no maximum ramp (acceleration) rates; (4) buyers (wholesalers) incur no avoidable (penalty) costs from failing to serve all of their "must serve" demand; and (5) security reserves to protect demand from outages are ignored. Other simplifications, relative to traditions that are common in experimental studies, but that are characteristic of observed power systems, include: (a) no demand-side bidding, and (b) the trading institution is a one-price sealed-bid auction. The earlier papers cited above are not restricted to the simplifications (2) -(4), while Olson, Rassenti, Smith, and Rigdon (1999) study a 9-node regional grid in the United States based on industrial parameters that are constrained by none of the conditions (1) - (5) and (a) -(b).
In Section 6 we relax condition (a) by introducing human agents as wholesale buyers who, symmetrically with generator owners, submit sealed bid schedules for the purchase of energy to deliver to their customers.
Unilateral Market Power
A firm is conventionally said to have market power when it can set a price greater than the marginal cost and still make positive sales. In the context of capacity-constrained competitors, Holt (1989) defines a game-theoretic formalization of market power arising when one or more firms can deviate profitably and unilaterally from the competitive outcome. If firms compete by posting prices, then market power exists when the competitive price cannot be supported as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In a deregulated world for electricity, firms will be submitting offer schedules as opposed to single price-quantity offers as means of expressing willingness to supply electricity. With a fixed set of generating capacities, a corresponding definition of market power can be applied to a market where firms submit offer schedules. If, for a given distribution of ownership of capacity, a firm profitably and unilaterally can submit an offer schedule above its marginal costs (or equivalently withdraw some generating capacity) such that the market price rises above the competitive level, then a firm is said to be able to exert market power in a sealed bid-offer market.
Consider figure 1 as an illustration of how market power can be represented in electricity markets where firms submit offer schedules to a central spot market coordinator, who dispatches injections to maximize the gains from exchange, given demand. Tables 1 and 2 list the marginal costs and values, respectively, for the arrays depicted in figure 1. We follow (a) from above in assuming that the buyers perfectly reveal their willingness to pay. In our three node radial network there are five firms (or sellers), denoted by an "S" and an identification number. In what we will call the "power treatment," S1 and S2 each own four units of intermediate cost ( The second and third steps of the demand in Table 2 represent interruptible units of demand, whereas the units on the first step at 226 are "must serve" or inelastic units. Think of the interruptible demand steps of each wholesale buyer as being implemented by contracts with their customers allowing energy flow to be interrupted if the wholesale price rises to the level of the step or greater.
We implement the demand steps in Table 2 by means of a fully demand revealing robot at each of the three demand nodes. In Section 6, however, we implement demand-side bidding by replacing each robot with an active human subject buyer who is profit motivated. In this final set of treatments, buyers (as well as sellers) are free to use their discretion to under-reveal true resale demand (or supply) in a two-sided sealed did-offer auction.
During the shoulder periods, the competitive price is equal to the marginal cost of the intermediate generators. However, both S1 and S2 can unilaterally withdraw (not submit offers for) four units of production entirely so that the price rises to the third step of the supply curve (166), where supply is contested by four units of peaking generation capacity. Alternatively, either S1 or S2
can increase the offer price for his intermediate capacity so that his offer sets the market price. It is important to note that it requires only one of S1 or S2 to undertake this profitable action that reduces his load but benefits all other sellers. Either one of them who does not withhold units will be even better off by not having reduced his sales volume. Unless they tacitly coordinate their offers, each has an incentive to free ride on the increased offer of the other.
At the competitive price of 76, S1 and S2 both earn a profit of 224 [(76 -20 Davis and Holt (1994) employ a related design in their study of market power in posted offer markets. We will call this the "no power" treatment. With this seemingly minor reallocation of capacity at Nodes 1 and 3, not a single seller can increase profit by offering units at supra-competitive levels in the shoulder period and consequently raise the market Step 1 Value = 226
Step 2 Value = 206
Step 
S1
and S2 can exert some market power during off-peak demands by raising the offers on two units of baseload capacity, regardless of the allocation of intermediate capacity. The theoretical upper bound on the price during off-peak demand is 76, the cost of intermediate generating capacity. We included the market power incentives in the off-peak demand so that the subjects in the experiment would earn some profit during the off-peak demand, and as a common control providing some market power incentives across sessions in all treatments.
Line Constraints and Market Segmentation
Our second treatment, using a structural feature that also introduces market power into an electricity network, is a capacity constraint on the right transmission line. In the "no line constraint"
4 It should be noted that a seller can submit any offer up to 96 for a Type C generators and hence set the price above the marginal cost of 76, but this action does not reduce efficiency. All of the gains from trade are still realized with this treatment, the maximum capacity of the transmission lines was set at seven units so as not to be close to a binding constraint for any level of demand for the market structure in figure figure 2 illustrates that with a line constraint, given that three units flows from Node 3 to Nodes 1 & 2, the Node 1 and 2 market only has one unit of excess capacity beyond the one unit of demand valued at 96. This provides S1 with an additional incentive to raise his offers because only two units deviation from the strict Bertrandesqe competitive equilibrium. 5 Price differences due to small line losses were considered insignificant relative to the treatment effects; hence, they were ignored in the experiments reported here. Line losses can be significant (15% or higher) on long lines. Backerman, Rassenti, and Smith (1997) study a high loss radial network with and without a constraint on one of two lines.
(as opposed to four units when there is no line constraint) are left out of the market when he exercises market power. More importantly, the line constraint interacts with the No Power design so that every seller except S3 has an incentive to offer intermediate capacity at a price greater than its marginal cost.
Experimental Design and Hypotheses
Table 3 summarizes our 2 × 2 experimental design. We conclude section 2 with a summary of the hypotheses, stating our treatment effects in Table 4 . We will analyze the data using a mixedeffects model for repeated measures [see e.g., Longford (1993) ]. The results from estimating this model by level of demand are given in Table 5 . The dependent variable is the difference between the observed price and the competitive price, P c . The line constraint segments the network into two local, but connected markets so that separate prices may clear the market on either side of the constraint.
When assessing the impact of the line constraint, we focus on the comparing the prices at where the sessions are indexed by i and the repeated market days by j. Note the distinction we maintain between a priori predicted one-tailed tests (e.g., β 1 > 0 for shoulder periods), and twotailed tests (e.g., 0 1 ≠ β , for peak periods). 
Procedures
To test how these two different structural features of electricity markets contribute singly and in tandem to the exercise of market power, we conducted sixteen market experiments using students from the Business College at the University of Arizona. Four sessions for each cell in Table 3 were conducted using the Power 2K software we developed. Each session lasted approximately ninety minutes.
We provided the subjects in each market with complete and full information on the market supply structure; i.e., every firm's generating capacity, marginal costs of production, and the position in the network were public information. Information on demand, however, was not given to the subjects. Because our primary interest is in firm behavior and the ability to exercise market power when demand is controlled, the computer acted as robot buyer submitting bids that exactly revealed the demand.
The subjects were told that the costs and the generating capacities for each seller would not change during the experiment, but that the maximum number of units that the buyers may purchase and the willingness to pay for those units would vary by period. In particular, the subjects were informed that the buyers would have three different levels of demand during each "market day", with 'Low Demand' indicating a willingness to buy fewer units at lower prices, with 'Medium Demand' indicating a willingness to buy more units at higher prices, and with 'High Demand' indicating a willingness to buy the most units at the highest prices. Each session lasted for fourteen market days where each day was comprised of a four period cycle. A day began with a shoulder period, followed by one peak, one shoulder, and lastly, one off-peak period. Thus, for each day we have two shoulder A subject had one minute to submit his offer each period. An offer was expressed as a step function indicating a schedule of prices and the maximum number of units at each of those prices that the subject was willing to produce. 6 A subject could at any time within the one minute revise his offer. When the clock expired, the offers and the computerized bids were sent to an optimization algorithm to maximize the total gains from trade in the network. In essence this reduces, in this simple environment, to arranging the offers from lowest to highest and the bids from highest to lowest and finding uniform nodal prices that maximize surplus, taking into account minor losses in transmission and any line constraints. Tied offers (at the same node) were broken on a firstsubmitted, first-served basis.
Each subject had participated in one trainer session two days earlier in the week. (The trainer session was comprised of six subjects in symmetric positions in a three node radial network that differed from the design in figure 1 .) The best performers in the trainer session were used two days later to participate in the above designs, with the top performers assigned to the roles of S1 and S2.
Subjects were paid $15 total for showing up on time for both the trainer sessions and the sessions reported here. In addition to this show-up fee, the average earnings per subject for session was $17.00. Figure 3 illustrates the average price paths at Nodes 1 and 2 for the four sessions in each cell of the 2 × 2 experimental design. All fourteen days of data by level of demand (period) are grouped together and then sequenced by how the demand varied over a market day: shoulder 1, peak, shoulder 2, and off-peak. We evaluate the results with respect to the competitive prediction, and the value of the nearest unit of interruptible demand, shown as a solid and dotted line, respectively. 7 Given that the buyers are simulated with a fully revealing robot, we expect ex ante that the sellers will push up their offers to the nearest unit of interruptible demand. These prices, however, are still 100% efficient. Differences exist in the off-peak period prices even though all 16 sessions make identical predictions under off-peak demand conditions. These latter observations provide measures of spillover or hysteresis effects on periods that are theoretically immune from all treatment effects.
Results
In what follows, our experimental results are summarized as a series of 5 findings (based primarily upon our prior predictions in Table 2 ) and 2 comments. In addition to the qualitative results displayed in Figure 3 , we employ a mixed-effects model for analyzing data with repeated measures (over 14 market days) as the basis for quantitative support. The results from estimating this model by period type (shoulder 1, peak, shoulder 2, off-peak) are given in Table 5 . Single sellers in each of the second and fourth sessions are unable to maintain higher prices by restricting output by four units or more. For the peak demand periods, prices are only above competitive levels on 5 occasions, save session 3, which is able to support slightly supra-competitive prices for the first 9 periods. In off-peak periods, prices are at first drawn to the competitive and zero profit level of 20, but S1 and S2 are successful in three of the sessions in pushing the price toward 76
(µ > 0), the marginal cost of the intermediate capacity. Quantitatively, figure 4 ). In the first shoulder period on day five, S3 offers his first three units at a price of 190. Having effectively withdrawn his units from the market, the price rises to 127 for that period. S3 quickly returns to lower offers and on only one other day does the price ever rise substantially above the 100% efficient range.
Consider now the effects of introducing market power. We summarize our results for this treatment.
Finding 2: Ceteris paribus, the redistribution of the ownership of supply units to introduce market power significantly raises prices in shoulder and off-peak periods. The
Power treatment has no effect on prices in peak periods, where no market power should be expressed.
Support: Figures 3 and 4 clearly illustrate that for the shoulder periods market prices in the Power
design (in red) are greater than in the No Power design when the transmission lines are unconstrained.
In the first and fourth Power sessions, every market price in the shoulder periods is considerably greater than the value of the last interruptible unit. In the second sessions, supra-competitive prices are observed in all shoulder periods after day 3. Prices in the third session are competitive in shoulder periods through day 9, after which time they rise substantially. There is no discernable separation in peak period prices. Off-peak prices are initially much higher in the Power treatment, but this difference fades in later days. These qualitative observations are supported by estimates from the mixed-effects model in The ability to exercise market power unilaterally is less apparent to the sellers in the third Power session, in which for nine days, the price is well within the 100% efficient range. In period three of day nine S2 drastically cuts back his output causing the price to spike to 178. After a couple more periods of low prices, the price shoots back up again in day eleven and continues to erode until the session ended. Even though this is a uniform price market, we conjecture that the price variability in the Power sessions can be attributed to a lack of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium at the competitive price [see Davis and Holt (1994) , Davis and Wilson (1999) , Kruse et al. (1994) , and Wilson (1998) for examples of posted-offer markets in which Edgeworth price cycles were observed in unilateral market power environments].
While it is individually profitable for either S1 or S2 to manipulate the market price, the resulting supra-competitive price also benefits all of the remaining sellers in a uniform price market.
In particular, the other large seller benefits the most by continuing to sell his units at the higher prices.
Our third finding reports that all sellers inflate their entire offer curves even though it is only the marginal offer that affects the price. We turn our attention to the line constraint treatment, which we summarize as our fourth finding.
Finding 4: Ceteris paribus, the Line Constraint treatment significantly raises prices in all types of demand-shoulder, peak, and off-peak.
Support: Figure 6 sharply contrasts the price effects of constraining the right transmission line to a maximum capacity of 3 units. In peak periods the line constraint shifts prices above 186, the highest cost generators. There are only 3 instances out of 56 peak periods in which the price level is at or below 186. In shoulder periods, the price only falls to 96 on two occasions; all other prices are much greater than the competitive level. As with the Power treatment, off-peak prices are initially much higher even though the constraint is no longer binding during those periods, but this difference wanes in later days. . This results in a high variance in the market price over time.
Our findings of market power and supra-competitive prices in the shoulder and peak periods have an unpredicted effect on prices in the off-peak periods. We summarize this as the following comment.
Comment 1: A history of market power, either by the transfer of ownership or by line constraints or both, foments less competitive supply behavior and concomitant higher prices in off-peak periods.
Support: Findings 2 and 4 and Table 5 provide the qualitative support that there is a treatment effect of higher prices in the off-peak periods even though the market structure and demand are identical in all 16 sessions. Finding 5: The Power and Line Constraint treatments have a statistically significant interaction effect in the shoulder and off-peak periods such that Power plus Line Constraint treatment is subadditive. In peak periods, the interaction effect is insignificant. Support: For this finding we rely on the estimates in Table 5 to isolate the interaction effects of the Power and Line Constraint treatments. Table 5 Under the conditions of no demand-side bidding, our results indicate that the distribution of ownership of a given set of generating assets can markedly contribute to the exercise of market power by well-positioned generator owners in supply side auctions in which demand is fully revealed and not subject to strategic bid behavior-only generators can behave strategically, and they do so to the disadvantage of buyers. In addition, small changes in line capacity can affect prices individually and interact with the distribution of ownership to introduce market power and spawn supra-competitive prices.
Demand-Side Bidding
In this Section we reexamine the above conclusions by introducing demand-side bidding in a symmetric two-sided auction institutional environment by replacing the robotically revealed expression of demand by profit motivated human subjects who have the discretionary option of under-revealing their demand, just as in the markets analyzed above sellers were free to under-reveal supply. We note that in our parameterization of demand no more than 16 percent of peak demand can be interrupted voluntarily by the wholesale buyers.
We know from previous studies that two-sided markets in electricity can be very competitive ,   8 but what has been missing is a rigorously controlled test explicitly examining the effect of introducing demand-side bidding, while holding constant all other conditions in the market. We hypothesize that demand-side bidding will have three primary effects on the results reported above for the one-sided market in which only the supply side is active: Prices will be lower and more competitive under both the market "power "and "no power" treatment conditions, and price volatility, as represented by the high incidence of price spikes in Figures 4 and 6, will be substantially eliminated.
To see why we expect these dramatic effects from demand-side bidding we refer to Figure 9 showing the anatomy of a price spike. Figure 9 illustrates the market offer curves for the two Day 2 shoulder periods of Power 4 session. In the first shoulder period, the market price is 100 with S1
offering 3 units at each of the prices 99 and 100 and one unit at each of the prices 110 and 120. In the next shoulder period, S1 offers 4 units at 99 and 4 units 150, with the last offer clearly setting the price. Without demand-side bidding, S1's offer results in a 50% increase in the price. Table 6 shows our extended 2 × 2 experimental design in which market power is varied between two of the same conditions shown in Table 3 , but this is now crossed with No Demand-side Bidding versus Demand-side Bidding. We incorporate active demand-side bidding into the market by giving 4 human bidders most of the demand given in Table 2 . The remaining demand assigned to the robot bidder is fully revealed in every period. The distribution of values for the demand-side bidding sessions is given in Table 7 .
Demand -Side Experimental Design

Findings
We present two findings on the effect of demand-side bidding. The qualitative and quantitative support for these findings are presented in Figures 10-12 and Table 8 , respectively. Table 8 reports the estimates of the mixed effects model for the design in Table 6 . In the interest of brevity we focus our attention exclusively on the shoulder periods. Step 1 Value = 226
Step 3 all of the surplus between the last demand step and the marginal cost in shoulder periods. Figure 10 illustrates that with demand-side bidding, the buyers push back to capture more than half of this surplus in shoulder periods. Support: With rather striking contrast, Figure 11 shows that demand-side bidding almost completely counteracts the Power treatment. Prices are consistently within the 100% efficient outcome range.
Furthermore, the time series of prices with demand-side bidding markedly lacks the volatility of the sessions without demand-side bidding. Figure 12 exemplifies why demand-side bidding eliminates price spikes and disciplines sellers. Notice in contrast to Figure 9 , 11 units of capacity, including 1 unit of baseload capacity, would need to be withheld in order to spike the price to 150. By underrevealing, buyers protect themselves against the sellers exerting market power; demand-side bidding makes it too costly for the sellers to restrict output and raise the price.
The striking differences in Figure 11 are statistically significant, as Table 8 shows. The Power × Demand-side Bidding interaction effect is highly significant in shoulder periods (both p-values are 0.0000). Moreover, the point estimate of the interaction effect effectively offsets the Power treatment effect (50.4 -49.8 = 0.6 in shoulder 1 periods and 40.7 -37.8 = 2.9 in shoulder 2 periods). !
Conclusions
Our results in this paper indicate that the distribution of ownership of a given set of generating assets can markedly contribute to the exercise of market power by well-positioned players in deregulated one-sided sealed offer auction markets. In addition, small changes in line capacity can affect prices individually and interact with the distribution of ownership to introduce market power and spawn supra-competitive prices. However, having established this, we also find the introduction of demand-side bidding in a two-sided auction market completely neutralizes the exercise of market power and eliminates price spikes. The obvious policy conclusion is that empowering the wholesale buyers provides a completely decentralized approach to the control of supply-side market power, and the control of price volatility. In the next generation of experiments we will investigate how demandside bidding interacts with line constraints. 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 
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